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Abstract
We extend modern Walrasian economics, and in particular the results
on Cournot convergence and dynamics, by focusing on renewable resources
in a spatial setting. Building on the harvesting model of Behringer and
Upmann (2014) we endogenize prices and investigate the two cases of
durable and non-durable renewable commodities. We find that endoge-
nizing prices is sufficient to prevent the full exploitation result and look at
how competition affects not only the stock but also the temporal incen-
tives for exploitation. We derive convergence results in static and dynamic
settings which suggest that the classical Cournotian outcomes may pre-
vail.
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1 Introduction
The theory of perfect competition originating in the works of Cournot and Edge-
worth has been successfully extended to non-cooperative settings that have a
dynamic nature. Important landmarks in this direction, in particular by Green
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and Radner, are assembled in a special edition of the Journal of Economic The-
ory 1980. The former has shown that in a repeated game setting, where a stage
game is replicated, a small degree of noise (imperfect information about some
aggregate statistic) is sufficient to get back to the stationary Cournot outcome
as individual deviations from collusive arrangements cannot be detected with
sufficient accuracy. This “limit principle” holds even if we are dealing with
finitely many agents only. Subsequently, Levine and Pesendorfer (1995) show
that for the collusive outcome to be sustained, the aggregate noise level has
to decrease with the number of agents sufficiently fast, see also Al-Najjar and
Smorodinsky (2000).
While classical mircoeconomic theory deals with homogenous consumption
goods in a static framework, we consider a dynamic framework. More precisely,
we consider the harvesting and sale of a renewable natural resources (fish, tim-
ber, game) the stock of which obeys a given law of growth.1 In addition, we
allow for the resources to be spatially extended taking into consideration de-
mands from the discipline and policy makers, see Deacon et al. (1998). We
then investigate the validity of the classical Courotian results for goods that are
heterogenous, thereby extending the classical results to renewable commodi-
ties in a dynamic setting. To this end we endogenize prices for both types of
commodities, non-durable and durable renewable ones by taking into account
output market behaviour.
Recently Behringer and Upmann (2014) investigate optimal harvesting of
a renewable resource that is spatially distributed over a continuous domain.
Since the agent is required to move in space, an optimal policy consists of an
optimal choice of both, harvesting and movement. This approach contrasts with
previous analyses of discrete spaces, e.g. Sanchirico and Wilen (1999, 2005) but
is similar to Belyakov and Veliov (2014) who also consider a continuous setting.2
The dynamic optimization problem in the model of Behringer and Upmann
(2014) consists of a simultaneous choice of the speed of movement {v(t)}t∈T
and the harvesting rate {h(t)}t∈T . More precisely, the harvesting agent moves
on the periphery of a unit circle on which the resource, with stock f(·), is grow-
ing according to some growth function g(·). The agent’s location s is therefore
on S = [0, 2pi]. T denotes the harvesting period or season [0, T ] and harvest-
ing comes at a cost C(·) that may depend on the speed of the agent and the
harvesting rate.
As the agent cannot harvest more than the entire resource stock at any
particular location, we have h(t) ≤ max {0, f(t, s(t))} . Harvesting takes place
only at the actual location of the agent x = s(t) and implies a downward jump
in the stock of the resource f(·, x) at the set of arrival times of the agent at
1See Smith (1968, 1977), Beddington et. al. (1975) or Clark et. al. (1979) for early economic
analyses.
2Harvesting models have also been intensively studies by Sebastian Anit¸a, see Anit¸a (2000)
and Anit¸a, Anit¸a, and Arna˘utu (2009) and also the references therein.
that location x : J(x) = {t1(x), t2(x), ...} . Accordingly the law of motion for
the stock is
ft(t, x) = g(f(t, x)) ∀ t ∈ T \J(x), x ∈ S (1)
f(t−, x)− f(t+, x) = h(t)∀ t ∈ J(x), x ∈ S (2)
with constant initial level f(0, x) = f0(x) for all x ∈ S.
Discounting at a rate ρ ≥ 0, the agent’s problem is
max
{v,h}
∫ T
0
e−ρt (h(t)− C(v(t), h(t))) dt
s.t.
s˙(t) = v(t), ∀t ∈ T
ft(t, x) = g(f(t, x)), ∀t ∈ T \J(x), x ∈ S
f(t−, x)− f(t+, x) = h(t), ∀t ∈ J(x), x ∈ S
h(t) ∈ H(t) ∀t ∈ T
f(0, x) = f0x, ∀x ∈ S
s(0) = 0.
The last line implies that w.l.o.g. we let the agent start at x = 0 on the
periphery.
For any fixed location equation (2) gives a mapping
f(t+i , x) = G(f(t
+
i−1(x), x), ti(x)− ti−1(x)) − h(ti(x))
where G is the solution of the differential equation between two consecutive
impulses, G(f, 0) = f, i.e. we have a problem where time and space of impulses
are related, i.e. not a pure impulse control problem as e.g. Yang (2001).3
Behringer and Upmann (2014) find that with linear growth and constant
speed, the resource will be fully extinguished by the agent by the end of the
planning horizon. As in the early literature on Walrasian economics, this work
treats prices as exogenous however. In order to fully trace out the welfare
economic consequences of trading renewable natural resource commodities in
the spirit of Cournot we endogenize prices in this paper. In contrast to the
stationary structure of repeated games, our analysis dealing with renewable
3Note that (1) is autonomous and does not depend on time t directly but only via f(·).
Hence if we integrate up (1) over the time of two consecutive rounds ti−1(x) and ti(x) we get
f(t+
i
(x), x) = G(f(t+
i−1
(x), ti(x)− ti−1(x)))
where we due to the ergodic structure we can now replace the space dimension by the time
difference (time it takes for one round) as time and space are directly related and it is either
time or space that matters.
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commodities allows us to investigate the validity of the Green’s “limit principle”
in a truly dynamic context.
Other recent advances in the wake of Green’s work are Al-Najjar and Smorodin-
sky (2000) and most recently Kalai and Shmaya (2015a, 2015b), who relax the
original complete information setting and, similar to Jehiel and Koessler (2008)
allow for boundedly rational behaviour as well as mixed strategies.
2 Non-durable good analysis
Consider a fixed location x ∈ S. Instead of letting the agent control the har-
vest h(t), we assume that the agent controls the harvesting share α(t), (i.e.
uses a fishing net with a given mesh size) so that the harvest amounts to
h(t) = α(t)f(t). This is the common formulation in the resource literature:
e.g. fish is harvested as a share α(t) of the stock and so the yield from fishing
is multiplicative in the stock.
We assume that costs of harvesting are linear and normalized to zero, im-
plying a strictly concave per-unit net revenue function of the form R(α(t)) =
α(t)(1 − α(t)). The per unit profit of the resource is thus increasing with the
share of fish put on the market for low harvesting shares, attains a maximum
at α = 1/2, and decreases afterwards reflecting the fact that the market be-
comes more and more saturated as α increases. This specification of the net
revenue corresponds to the existence of a single harvesting agent, who supplies
the market as a monopolist. In section 4 we will extend this to an oligopolistic
context where multiple harvesting agents supply the market and are thus in
competition.
We assume that the commodity is non-durable, and so cannot be stored but
has to be consumed immediately after purchase. Therefore the quantities sup-
plied to the market do not accumulate over time. The optimal control problem
is then:
max
α∈A
∫ T
0
e−ρtR(α(t))fα(t)dt (3)
where A = {α ∈ L∞(0, T ); 0 ≤ α(t) ≤ 1 a.e.} is the set of admissible controls.
As in Behringer and Upmann (2014) we assume exponential growth from here
onwards as this simplifies the presence of the economic discounting factor sub-
stantially.
We denote by fα(t−) the level of the renewable resource at some x =
mod(vt, 2pi) just before harvesting, so just before the next supply to the mar-
ket. Likewise the level of the resource immediately after harvesting is denoted
fα(t+) . The initial level of the resource at x is f0(x), ∀x ∈ S as motivated
above.
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We denote for any fixed α and any round l = {0, 1, ..., k} of the k complete
rounds4 the stock of the resource by fαl : [0, θ)→ R+ as a function of the time
elapsed since the last arrival (at time lθ). Note that the time necessary to circle
around the periphery once is θ ≡ 2pi/v,so that the stock (and thus the density)
is a function of the travelling time θ (or equivalently of speed v).
The travelling time for one complete round on the circle equals the duration
between any two consecutive arrivals times at a (any) location and thus equals
the growth time of the resource between two subsequent harvesting times. Con-
sequently, the stock of the resource depends on the travelling time θ (or speed
v) and on the harvesting share α according to the law of motion as motivated
above.
Then, using the above definitions we obtain
fα(t+) = (1 − α(t))fα(t−)
and because of exponential growth at r it also follows that
fα ((t+ θ)−) = erθ(1− α(t))fα(t−). (4)
Equation (4) thus states that the density at time t + θ just before harvesting
equals the original density at t before harvesting, of which the harvesting share
at t has been deducted and which has since grown according to the exponential
growth rate.
As there are k complete rounds until T we have that
kθ ≤ T < (k + 1)θ, k ∈ N.
For convenience, we extend the time horizon beyond the end of the harvesting
period as
fα(t−) = 0 on (T, (k + 1)θ
to allow for k complete rounds of supply and a possibly incomplete round on the
circle with the density after T being zero. This vaporizing stock after T then
notionally extends the time horizon but does not affect the optimization prob-
lem. It only relaxes the effect that the fixed time horizon has on the possibility
to treat only integer rounds.
Now for some round l ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...k} on the circle that takes place at some
time interval t ∈ [lθ, (l + 1)θ] , we define
fαl ((t− θl)−) ≡ fα(t−), l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} ,
4Note that in order to achieve full coherence between noation and semantics we refer to the
“lth round” as the “(l + 1)th round”, as our counting variable l starts at zero which however
corresponds to the very first round that agent undertakes. In addition to a notional extension
of the density function beyond the fixed time horizion (see below) this minor linguistic inac-
curacy makes our analysis and its description much less cumbersome than it otherwise would
be.
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the stock of the resource just before harvesting extended l ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...k} periods
into the past. We can then also define the stock of the resource l periods into
the future (by adding time θl to the above) as
fαl (t−) ≡ fα ((t+ θl)−) .
for any round l ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...k}.
Adding time θl to (4) we find
fα ((t+ θ + θl)−) = fαl+1 ((t)−) = erθ(1− α(t+ θl))fα((t+ θl)−)
= erθ(1 − α(t+ θl))fαl ((t)−)
by the ergodic structure obtained which holds for all l ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...k} as α does
not impact f differently over rounds and we make use of the extended time
horizon. We thus have for the time interval t ∈ [lθ, (l + 1)θ] that
fαl+1 ((t)−) = erθ(1− α(t+ θl))fαl ((t)−)
i.e. the density just before harvesting at any round l+1 is given by the original
density in round l just before harvesting, of which the harvesting share in that
round has been deducted and which since has grown (for one round of time)
according to the exponential growth rate. For the first period, where previous
harvesting trivially cannot have a consequence for present harvest and hence α
is not an argument to be considered, this reduces to
fα0 (t−) = ertf0(tv)
where x =mod(vt, 2pi) = vt if t ∈ [0, θ) gives the location in the first round.
Thus we find the ergodic relation between round l ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...k} densities and
the following round densities for t ∈ [lθ, (l+ 1)θ] as:{
fαl+1 (t−) = erθ(1 − α(t+ θl))fαl (t−)
fα0 (t−) = ertf0(tv)
. (5)
The optimal control problem given in (3) is
max
α∈A
G(α) = max
α∈A
∫ T
0
e−ρtα(t)(1 − α(t))fα(t)dt. (6)
where A = {α ∈ L∞(0, T ); 0 ≤ α(t) ≤ 1 a.e.} is the set of admissible controls.
This objective can be rewritten as the sum of k completed and a possibly
incomplete round on the circle as
G(α) =
k−1∑
l=0
∫ θ
0
e−ρ(t+θl)α (t+ θl) (1− α (t+ θl)) fαl (t−)dt
+
∫ T−θk
0
e−ρ(t+θk)α (t+ θk) (1− α (t+ θk)) fαk (t−)dt
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which amounts to a monopoly analysis.
Existence of an optimal control has been shown by Anit¸a, Arna˘utu, and
Capasso (2011), Arna˘utu and Neittaanma¨ki (2003), and Barbu (1994), going
back to a problem of Brokate (1985). Let α∗ be such an optimal control. Then,
for any w ∈ L∞(0, T ) such that only 0 ≤ α∗(t) + εw(t) ≤ 1 a.e., for sufficiently
small ε > 0 holds, we have that
G(α∗) ≥ G(α∗ + εw).
Whence we have, making use of the extended time horizon that, summing over
the k + 1 rounds
k∑
l=0
∫ θ
0
e−ρ(t+θl)α∗ (t+ θl) (1− α∗ (t+ θl)) fα∗l (t−)dt
≥
k∑
l=0
∫ θ
0
e−ρ(t+θl)(α∗ + εw) (t+ θl) (1− α∗ − εw) (t+ θl) fα∗+εwl (t−)dt.
(7)
holds. The following Lemma implies that due to its ergodic structure we can
derive a system without impulses.
Lemma 1. It holds that
0 ≥
k∑
l=0
∫ θ
0
e−ρ(t+θl)
[
w (t+ θl) (1− 2α∗ (t+ θl)) fα∗l (t−)
+α∗ (t+ θl) (1− α∗ (t+ θl)) zl(t)] dt
(8)
with 

zl+1(t) = e
rθ
[
−w (t+ θl) fα∗l (t−) + (1− α∗ (t+ θl)) zl(t)
]
,
t ∈ [0, θ) , l = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1,
z0(t) = 0.
(9)
where
zl = lim
ε→0
fα
∗+εw − fα∗
ε
in L∞(0, T ). (10)
Proof. See Appendix.
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2.1 Duality
We now denote the adjoint state by p = p(t), i.e. p satisfies

pl(t) = e
rθ (1− α∗ (t+ θl)) pl+1(t)
+ e−ρ(t+θl)α∗ (t+ θl) (1− α∗ (t+ θl)) ,
t ∈ [0, θ) , l = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1,
pk(t) =


e−ρ(t+θk)α∗ (t+ θk) (1− α∗ (t+ θk)) ,
t ∈ [0, T − θk) ,
0, t ∈ [T − θk, θ] .
(11)
For the construction of the adjoint problems in optimal control theory we refer
to Anit¸a, Arna˘utu, and Capasso (2011), Arna˘utu, Neittaanma¨ki (2003), and
Barbu (1994).
Defining al(t) ≡ 12
(
1− eρ(t+θl)+rθpl+1(t)
)
, for t ∈ [0, θ) and l = 0, 1, . . . , k−1
we can show the following:
Proposition 2. The optimal control α∗ can be characterized as:
α∗ (t+ θl) =


al(t) for al(t) ∈ [0, 1]
0 for al(t) < 0
1 for al(t) > 1
for t ∈ [0, θ) and l = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1.
In particular, we find for the (potentially incomplete) round k + 1 that
α∗ (t+ θk) =
1
2
, for t ∈ [0, T − θk] .
Proof. See Appendix.
The proof of this proposition makes use of the dual formulation. As argued
above, with the law of motion being the spatial dimension of the problem is
absorbed into the temporal one without loss of generality. The proof now shows
that one may integrate up the system (9) over consecutive rounds instead of
the whole time horizon and thus segment the problem further. Then, as system
(9) gives z0(t) = 0 for the limit of the differential quotient of the densities for
small deviations from the optimum (10) for very first round (see footnote 4), one
can use the inequality (8) from the above Lemma 1 to find a condition similar
to a “standard first-order-condition” of optimization despite the complications
resulting from the Lebesgue generalization. The satisfaction of this condition
yields the above proposition.
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We thus find that the result of Behringer and Upmann (2014) of full resource
exploitation can be proved more generally. Here however the price effect will im-
ply that half of the resource is saved. Having a share larger than half cannot be
optimal as it implies that by choosing 1−α one may generate the same revenue
R(α(t)) but leave more of the resource in place, which is clearly better. Also the
duality analysis allows for numerical tests that extend the present framework to
more realistic and heterogenous distributions of the resource. This is ongoing
work in Anit¸a et. al. (2016). There it can be seen easily that the standard case
for the non-terminal phases of the horizon is where the adjoint state is “large”
so that al(t) < 0 and so it is optimal for the agent to refrain from harvesting
and supplying to the market. Interestingly as shown in Anit¸a et. al. (2016),
heterogenous resource distributions may imply that multiple optimal control
levels satisfy al(t) ∈ [0, 1] towards the end of the horizon which suggest that the
monopoly harvesting problem becomes more intricate.
2.2 Aggregate revenue for some constant shares
By fixing the shares that the monopolist can deliver to the market in each period
(e.g. if there are regulations of minimum mesh size for fisheries) we can describe
the form of the total aggregate revenue in more detail.
For a fixed location x ∈ S, let y0 = e(r−ρ)tf0(x) denote the stock at the first
harvest at x, where f0(x) is uniformly distributed on the periphery. Assuming
N rounds, the objective function (6) becomes:
G(α) =
N∑
n=1
y0αn(1 − αn)eθ(n−1)(r−ρ)
n−1∏
i=1
(1− αi),
where αn = α|[θ(n−1),θn).
Proposition 3. Total revenue with constant α and net growth σ ≡ r − ρ can
be calculated as:
G(θ, α) = α
2piy0
σθ
× (12)

1
−(α+e−σθ−1)2×

(α − 1)(2e−σθ − e−2σθ − 1)+
 (α− 1 +Nα)eσθ(N+1)+(Nα2 − 2α+ 2− 2Nα)eσθ(N+2)+
(α − 1−Nα2 +Nα)eσθ(N+3)

 e−3σθ(1− α)N

+
(1− (N + 1)α)αN (eσmod(T,θ) − 1) eNσθ


Proof. See Appendix.
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This characterization allows for further numerical examples that show the
trade-offs between the speed with which an agent moves on the periphery and
the optimal amounts of the renewable non-durable commodity that is put on
the market.
2.2.1 Examples
Given the parameters T = 10, σ = 3/20, y0 = 1.
We first assume that the time to circle once is θ = 5, so that exactly two
rounds are completed as N =
⌊
T
θ
⌋
=
⌊
10
5
⌋
= 2. We have mod(T, θ) = 0, so that
the final term in (12) falls out. We then have
G(θ, α) =
N∑
i=1
E(i) + E(N + 1, s(T )) =
8
3
piα
α− 1(
α+ e−
3
4 − 1
)2 (e− 32 − 2e− 34 + 2e 34
− e 32 − 8αe 34 + 4α+ 4αe 32 + 8α2e 34 − 2α3e 34 − 3α2 − 5α2e 32 + 2α3e 32
)
We can plot the G function as in Figure 1 and find the optimal α for two
rounds at about α∗ = 0.28. Note that, as argued before, a constant share larger
than one half is never optimal and may even yield a negative objective G. With
two rounds to complete harvesting everything already in the first round and
thus flooding the market yields a slightly better outcome than leaving little for
the next round but being careful with the resource by choosing to harvest about
a quarter each round yields the highest objective outcome for the monopoly.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
α
G
Figure 1: G evaluated at θ = 5.
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We now assume that the time to circle once is θ = 10, so that exactly one
round is completed as N =
⌊
10
10
⌋
= 1, and again mod(T, θ) = 0. We have
G(θ, α) =
N∑
i=1
E(i) + E(N + 1, s(T )) =
4
3
piα
α− 1(
α+ e−
3
2 − 1
)2 (e−3 − 3e− 32
− e 32 + 2αe− 32 +2αe 32 − 4α− α2e 32 + α2 + 3
)
We can plot the G function as in Figure 2 and find the optimal α to be
α∗ = 0.5. Hence with only one round to complete the monopolist simply supplies
the optimal static quantity of one half to the market.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
α
G
Figure 2: G evaluated at θ = 10.
2.3 Aggregate revenue for any constant shares
We can also describe what happens to the objective when we vary the speed
with which the agents harvests the renewable resource but fix the harvesting
share. Plotting (12) for T = 10, σ = 3/20, y0 = 1, we find the following plot for
G(θ, α = 1/10) in θ (Figure 3) and for G(θ = 3, α) in α (Figure 4).
Note that for varying speeds, the “zigzags” of the objective result from the
fact that for certain speeds the agent may just manage to complete the final
round so that there is no “gap” in the distribution of the resource that results
from the agent’s initial position. This of course is specific to the assumption of
having a uniform distribution of the resource, i.e. y0 = 1 and relaxed in Anit¸a
et. al. (2016).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Θ
-2
-1
1
2
3
4
G
Figure 3: G evaluated at α = 1/10.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Α
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
G
Figure 4: G evaluated at θ = 3.
Also we present a general contour plot for G(θ, α) in α, θ (Figure 5) where we
allow for the harvesting share and the speed of the agent to vary independently.
Note that higher values of the objective function are characterized by lighter
colours. The “zigzags” carry over into the picture as they are a property of
varying speed only for any chosen value of the harvesting share.
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0.5
Θ
Α
Figure 5: Objective function G.
The comparative statics reveals that higher speed implies a larger optimal
exploitation, as the agent will have an increased concern for growth at any
particular location for more frequent returns. Given that the speed is such that
the agent completes exactly one round, the optimal solution coincides with the
static monopoly problem.
3 Durable good analysis
In this section we explore the case of a durable good. With the good being
durable, the quantity bought by consumers does not perish and may thus be
consumed later. In this way, the amount of the commodity supplied to (and sold
on) the market decreases demand in later periods - thus intertemporal demand
effects result. Assume that the agent selects speed so that he/she accomplishes
to complete N full rounds of circling and harvesting, i. e. θ = T/N . Then, the
new net revenue function takes the form
R(α(n)) = α(n)×
(
1−
n∑
α(n)
)
13
so that earlier supplies to the market will decrease the marginal return on later
ones. The present value from the nth arrival at location x is then
y0αn(1−
n∑
i=1
αi)e
tn(r−ρ)
n−1∏
i=1
(1− αi).
As we sum over N periods or circling rounds at constant speed v we have
G˜(α) =
N∑
n=1
y0αn(1−
n∑
i=1
αi)e
tn(r−ρ)
n−1∏
i=1
(1− αi)
=y0α1(1− α1)et1(r−ρ)
+ y0α2(1− (α1 + α2))et2(r−ρ)(1− α1)
+ y0α3(1− (α1 + α2 + α3))et3(r−ρ)(1− α1)(1 − α2)
+ ...
+ y0αN (1 −
N∑
i=1
αi)e
tN (r−ρ)
N−1∏
i=1
(1− αi).
(13)
Clearly the spatial dimension of the problem remains relevant as the agent
returns to any position in future rounds. We can now show that:
Proposition 4. Let K = {α = (α1, α2, . . . , αN ) ∈ RN ; 0 ≤ αj , ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N},
N∑
j=1
αj ≤ 1}. Then G˜(α) attains a global maximum in α∗ = (α∗1, α∗2, . . . , α∗N ) on
K. Also there are only two situations: I) α∗ ∈ Int(K), II) α∗1 = α∗2 = · · · =
α∗n = 0 and α
∗
n+1 6= 0, . . . , α∗N 6= 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Examples for N = 2 and N = 3 in the appendix show that the maximum of
G˜(α) is attained for α∗ ∈ Int(K). We further find that:
Lemma 5. With slow growth we get Cournot type solutions for N rounds of
the form α∗ = (α∗1, α
∗
2, . . . , α
∗
N ), with
α∗j ≈
1
N + 1
.
Proof. See Appendix.
We therefore generally find a convergence of α in o(1/N). This result is intu-
itive as with a durable, spatially heterogeneous renewable resource commodity,
the monopolist plays against itself each round and thus against its own time-
variant copies. With the monopoly result at hand, we now turn to the case of
a non-cooperative game between a finite number of players.
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4 A durable good game
Denote a normal form game by Γ = (I,X, u) were i = {1, 2, ..., I} is the set of
symmetric players with (finite) strategies Xi from the set of strategy profiles
A = ×Ii=1Ai. Then ui : X → R+ is the payoff function for player i and
u = (u1, ...uI) the payoff function of the game. The new individual net revenue
functions now take on the game form
R(α(n), i) = α(n, i)×
(
1−
n∑ i∑
α(n, i)
)
For a fixed location and N periods we therefore have individual payoffs given
by:
ui(α−i) = y0
N∑
n=1
αi,n(1−
I∑
j=1
n∑
y=1
αj,y)e
tn(r−ρ)
n−1∏
i=1
(1− αi) ∀i = {1, ..., I} . (14)
A Nash equilibrium of Γ is a strategy profile α∗ = (α∗i , α
∗
−i) such that for
any player i
ui(α
∗) ≥ ui(αi, α∗−i), ∀αi ∈ Ai.
Lemma 6. The durable good game with I firms and slow growth has a symmet-
ric Nash equilibrium
α∗i ≈
1
I(N − 1) + 2 ∀i = {1, ..., I} .
Proof. See Appendix.
4.1 An instructive durable good game example
What happens if growth is not small? We now present an instructive example
for a game with two rounds and an arbitrary number of players.
For two rounds, N = 2, and a total number of I players that put βj each in
round j in on the market, we have the objective as
G˜(α)
∣∣∣
N=2
= y0
(
α1(1− α1 − (I − 1)β1)et1 + α2 (1− (α1 + α2
+(I − 1)(β1 + β2))) et2(1− α1)
)
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where again we neglect discounting to avoid clutter. From the foc ∂G˜(α)/∂α1 =
0 we find
α1 =
et1 + β1e
t1 − 2α2et2 + α22et2 − α2β1et2 − α2β2et2 − β1Iet1 + α2β1Iet2 + α2β2Iet2
2et1 − 2α2et2
From the foc ∂G˜(α)/∂α2 = 0 we find
α2 =
1
2
(1− α1 − β1(I − 1)− β2(I − 1))
for any growth pattern. Solving simultaneously yields optimal shares
α1 =
1
3et2

−4et1 + 3et2 +
√√√√√ 4e
t1(4et1 − 3et2)+
(I − 1)2 (β1 + β2)2 e2t2+
4(I − 1) (β1 + 4β2) et2et1
− 2(I − 1)(β1 + β2)et2


and
α2 =
1
2
(1− α∗1 − (I − 1)(β1 + β2)) .
Note that for I = 1 we obtain the results from the durable good monopoly
example.
Assume growth again satisfies 34e
t2 < et1 < et2 as in the durable good anal-
ysis above. In particular let et1 = 1 and et2 = 11/9. To solve for symmetric
equilibrium over rounds, the optimal share α1 of a player needs to be the same
as the optimal share as that of all the other players β. This is the case in both
rounds. Hence with β1 = α1, β2 = α2, solving the resulting system simultane-
ously again, we find the equilibrium share in round 1 with I players as:
α∗1 =
1
I
− (1
I
I + 1
44I + 22
(
9I2 + 7I + 20−
√
81I4 + 126I3 + 409I2 − 512I + 4
)
and the equilibrium share in round 2 with I players as:
α∗2 =
1
44I + 22
(
9I2 + 7I + 20−
√
81I4 + 126I3 + 409I2 − 512I + 4
)
Both can be graphically represented, with round 1 in red, see Figure 6.
Confirming our earlier results, for I = 1 (monopoly) we find α∗1 ≈ 0.224 and
α∗2 ≈ 0.388 , leaving more than half of the resource unharvested. For duopoly
we find for each player equilibrium shares of α∗1 ≈ 0.282 and α∗2 ≈ 0.145. It can
be shown straightforwardly that payoffs (profits) G˜(α)
∣∣∣
N=2
are monotonically
decreasing in I, as is the final resource stock. The limits for the total harvested
shares each round (1 in red again) are given in Figure 7.
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Figure 6: Game figure.
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Figure 7: Game figure
Note that the resource is fully depleted asymptotically already in round 1
(even without discounting) so that competition between more players is detri-
mental for the resource both in a quantity and a time dimension. Hence with
many players we find an equilibrium result in this game that is very different
from the cases I and II in monopoly.
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Generally we observe that for the equilibrium strategies convergence satisfies
α∗i = o (1/(NI)) .
The symmetric equilibrium limit price (with many players I and/or many rounds
N) for a given demand is thus:
lim
N→∞
p∗ = lim
N→∞
or I→∞

1− I∑
y=1
N∑
j=0
αj,y (t+ θj)


= lim
N→∞
or I→∞
(1−NIo(1/NI)) = 0,
which is the normalized level of marginal costs in this model so that we have
Cournot convergence to the Walrasian price (perfect competition).
5 The limit principle
Green’s limit principle is derived in a repeated game setting. With I symmetric
players (firms) and N discrete rounds with fixed locations we found symmetric
equilibrium shares of
α∗i =
1
I(N − 1) + 2
for each round of harvesting of the durable good with N, I > 1.
A general problem in continuous time games is that looking at deviations
from collusive behaviour is generically trivial, as they are immediately detected
and punished. Here we have a natural way of “discretizing” the continuum by
assuming that individual deviation detection takes a full round so that deviation
profits for firm i from the shared monopoly outcome are
pidi = max
αi∈A
∫ t1
0

e−ρtαi(t)

1− αi(t)−∑
j 6=i
α∗j (t)

 fα(t−)− C(α(t))

 dt.
Under discounting, deviation will take place in the first round or never5. The
deviation profit satisfies
pidi >
∫ t1
0

e−ρtα∗i (t)

1− α∗i (t)−∑
j 6=i
α∗j (t)

 fα(t−)− C(α(t))

 dt ≡ pi∗i
i.e. exceeds the equilibrium payoff during the punishment rounds.
5This changes if we take the growth process into account.
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As in Green (1980) we assume that in the replica economy indexed by r,
the individual demands are equally scaled up by I. Then the individual firm
monopoly level, i.e. the collusive outcome with equally shared production is
αM,ri =
1
N + 1
∀i = {1, ..., I}
and deviation may be punished (ad infinitum) by playing the scaled symmetric
Cournot equilibrium
α∗,ri = Iα
∗
i =
I
I(N − 1) + 2 .
Note that α∗,ri > α
M,r
i as I > 1.
Lemma 7. In the replica economy, there exists a discount rate ρ > 0 small
enough, such that the collusive outcome is an equilibrium in the continuous
time game.
Proof. See Appendix.
Now assume that individual shares are subject to some idiosyncractic noise
term α˜i = αi + ε˜i where ε˜i ∼ N(0, V ar(ε)) with 0 < V ar(ε) < ∞ and that
the cartel can observe only some aggregate statistic of play, e.g. the price in
the replica economy, where aggregate demand I(1− p) equals aggregate supply∑I
i=1 αi. This random variable that satisfies
p˜r = 1− 1
I
I∑
i=1
(αri + ε˜i) .
We then find that:
Proposition 8. With idiosyncratic noise ε˜i ∼ N(0, V ar(ε)), individual devia-
tions become undetectable and we get the limit principle to hold in the durable
good game.
Proof. See Appendix.
As observed in Mas-Colell (1988, p.30) this finding is somewhat paradox-
ical in the theory of perfect competition as it is not perfect information but
noise that helps perfect competition to come about. In the non-durable com-
modity case, as has been shown in section 2 and by Anit¸a et. al. (2016). the
monopoly solution often implies letting the resource grow unimpaired and har-
vest the profit maximizing quantity only in the last round. This however is
not implementable with more than one player, as deviation in this last round
cannot be punished. Hence the optimal collusive outcome cannot be sustained
even without noise and the limit principle holds.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that endogenizing prices prevents the extinction of
the renewable resource compared to the 2014 model of Behringer and Upmann.
Letting prices fluctuate therefore presents an alternative policy to forcing the
agent to go multiple rounds or to move with a minimum speed in order to make
him/her take into account the future more seriously.
Also we have shown that in a harvesting game, competition will have a
critical temporal dimension in addition to the negative effects on the stock of
the renewable resource in that the resource is depleted earlier. Optimal shares
of the harvested renewable resource in this fully dynamic spatial model inherit
the convergence properties of the static Cournot model. Hence the Walrasian
properties, implying perfect competition with many firms but also the dynamic
results of Green (1980) for a stationary repeated game setting are reestablished.
Green’s limit principle is shown to be robust to the investigation of competition
in durable and non-durable renewable resources in our non-stationary setting.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Rearranging (7) we get
0 ≥ −
k∑
l=0
∫ θ
0
e−ρ(t+θl)α∗ (t+ θl) (1− α∗ (t+ θl)) fα∗l (t−)dt
+
k∑
l=0
∫ θ
0
e−ρ(t+θl)(α∗ + εw) (t+ θl) (1− α∗ − εw) (t+ θl) fα∗+εwl (t−)dt
or
0 ≥
k∑
l=0
∫ θ
0
e−ρ(t+θl)
[
−α∗ (t+ θl) (1− α∗ (t+ θl)) fα∗l (t−)
+ (α∗ + εw) (t+ θl) (1− α∗ − εw) (t+ θl) fα∗+εwl (t−)
]
dt.
Expanding, transforming, and dividing by ε > 0 yields
0 ≥
k∑
l=0
∫ θ
0
e−ρ(t+θl) [w (t+ θl) (1− 2α∗ (t+ θl)
−εw (t+ θl)) fα∗l (t−) + (α∗ (t+ θl)
+εw (t+ θl)) (1− α∗ (t+ θl)− εw (t+ θl))
(
fα
∗+εw
l − fα
∗
l
)
(t−)
ε

 dt.
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Taking ε→ 0 we find
0 ≥
k∑
l=0
∫ θ
0
e−ρ(t+θl)
[
w (t+ θl) (1− 2α∗ (t+ θl)) fα∗l (t−)
+α∗ (t+ θl) (1− α∗ (t+ θl)) zl(t)] dt.
Noting that
zl = lim
ε→0
fα
∗+εw
l − fα
∗
l
ε
∈ L∞(0, T )
and using (5) we get the conclusion.
Proof of Proposition 2. We multiply the first equation in (11) by zl(t),
integrate on [0, θ) and add up over l to k − 1. We get that
k−1∑
l=0
∫ θ
0
pl(t)zl(t)dt =
k−1∑
l=0
∫ θ
0
[
erθ (1− α∗ (t+ θl)) pl+1(t)zl(t)
+e−ρ(t+θl)α∗ (t+ θl) (1− α∗ (t+ θl)) zl(t)
]
dt.
Now replace from (9) that
erθ (1− α∗ (t+ θl)) zl(t) = zl+1(t) + erθw (t+ θl) fα
∗
l (t−),
so that
k−1∑
l=0
∫ θ
0
pl(t)zl(t)dt =
k−1∑
l=0
∫ θ
0
pl+1(t)
[
zl+1(t) + e
rθw (t+ θl) fα
∗
l (t−)
]
dt
+
k−1∑
l=0
∫ θ
0
e−ρ(t+θl)α∗ (t+ θl) (1− α∗ (t+ θl)) zl(t)dt.
Since z0(t) = 0 and pk(t) satisfies the second equation in (11), we may conclude
that
k−1∑
l=0
∫ θ
0
erθw (t+ θl) fα
∗
l (t−)pl+1(t))dt
+
∫ T−kθ
0
e−ρ(t+θk)α∗ (t+ θk) (1− α∗ (t+ θk)) zk(t)dt
+
k−1∑
l=0
∫ θ
0
e−ρ(t+θl)α∗ (t+ θl) (1− α∗ (t+ θl)) zl(t)dt = 0
and
k∑
l=0
∫ θ
0
e−ρ(t+θl)α∗ (t+ θl) (1− α∗ (t+ θl)) zl(t)dt
= −
k−1∑
l=0
∫ θ
0
erθw (t+ θl) fα
∗
l (t−)pl+1(t))dt
(15)
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Using (8) we obtain
0 ≥
k−1∑
l=0
∫ θ
0
[
w (t+ θl) fα
∗
l (t−)e−ρ(t+θl) (1− 2α∗ (t+ θl))
+e−ρ(t+θl)α∗ (t+ θl) (1− α∗ (t+ θl)) zl(t)
]
dt
+
∫ θ
0
e−ρ(t+θk)w (t+ θk) (1− 2α∗ (t+ θk)) fα∗k (t−)dt.
(16)
From (15) we get now that
0 ≥
k−1∑
l=0
∫ θ
0
w (t+ θl)
[
e−ρ(t+θl) (1− 2α∗ (t+ θl))
−erθpl+1(t)
]
fα
∗
l (t−)dt
+
∫ θ
0
e−ρ(t+θk)w (t+ θk) (1− 2α∗ (t+ θk)) fα∗k (t−)dt,
(17)
∀w (which is arbitrary) such that 0 ≤ α∗ + εw ≤ 1, a.e.
Proof of Proposition 3. One round of cycling yields
E(1) =α(1 − α)y0
∫ 2pi
0
e(r−ρ)t1(x)dx = α(1 − α)y0
∫ 2pi
0
e(r−ρ)
θx
2pi dx
=α(1 − α)y0 2pi
(r − ρ)θ
(
e(r−ρ)θ − 1
)
,
so total discounted supply in the nth period is
E(n) =α
(
1−
n∑
i=1
αi
)
(1− α)n−1y0
∫ 2pi
0
e−ρtn(x)e((n−1)rθ+r
θx
2pi )dx
=α (1− nα) (1− α)n−1 2piy0
(r − ρ)θ
(
e(r−ρ)θ − 1
)
e(n−1)(r−ρ)θ.
Summing over all periods (defining the net growth rate as σ ≡ r− ρ) this yields
n∑
i=1
E(i) =
n∑
i=1
α(1− iα)(1 − α)i−1 2piy0
σθ
(eσθ − 1)e(i−1)σθ
= −2piy0
σθ
α
(α+ e−σθ − 1)2 ×

(α− 1)(2e−σθ − e−2σθ − 1)
+

 (α− 1 + nα)eσθ(n+1)+(nα2 − 2α+ 2− 2nα)eσθ(n+2)+
(α− 1− nα2 + nα)eσθ(n+3)

 e−3σθ(1 − α)n


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if (1− α)eσθ − 1 6= 0.
For the possibly incomplete final round we have
E(n) = α (1− nα) (1− α)n−1 2piy0
σθ
(
eσθ − 1) e(n−1)σθ
so that
E(n, x) = α (1− nα)αn−1 2piy0
σθ
(
eσ
θx
2pi − 1
)
e(n−1)σθ
and
E(n+ 1, s(T )) = α (1− (n+ 1)α)αn 2piy0
σθ
(
eσ
θs(T )
2pi − 1
)
enσθ
So if we add up to N we get
G(θ, α) =
N∑
i=1
E(i) + E(N + 1, s(T ))
as given above.
Proof of Proposition 4. As
K =

α = (α1, α2, . . . , αN ) ∈ RN ; 0 ≤ αj , ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N},
N∑
j=1
αj ≤ 1

 ,
we have G˜ : K → R. Since G˜ is a continuous function and K is compact, by
Weierstass Theorem we conclude that G˜ attains its global maximum on K in
α∗ = (α∗1, α
∗
2, . . . , α
∗
N ). We prove that we have only two situations:
I. α∗ ∈ Int(K);
II. α∗1 = α
∗
2 = · · · = α∗n = 0 and α∗n+1 6= 0, . . . , α∗N 6= 0. We denote by
Kn :=

(αn+1, . . . , αN ) ∈ RN−n; 0 ≤ αj , ∀j ∈ {n+ 1, . . . , N},
N∑
j=n+1
αj ≤ 1

 .
Then
(
α∗n+1, α
∗
n+2, . . . , α
∗
N
) ∈ Int(Kn).
We argue by reductio ad absurdum: Assume that α∗ ∈ ∂K (where ∂K is
the boundary of K).
If
N∑
j=1
α∗j = 1, then consider the smallest n such that
n∑
j=1
α∗j = 1. It follows
that α∗n+1 = α
∗
n+2 = · · · = 0 and that
G˜(α∗) = y0
n∑
j=1
α∗j (1−
j∑
k=1
α∗k)e
tj(r−ρ)
j−1∏
i=1
(1− α∗i ).
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Since
n∑
j=1
α∗j = 1, if we take α˜ =
(
α∗1, α
∗
2, . . . , α
∗
n−1,
α∗n
2 , 0, 0, . . . , 0
)
∈ K, then
G˜(α˜) > G˜(α∗)
and this is a contradiction.
If there is a n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} such that α∗n = 0, then consider the smallest
such n. For n ≥ 2 and a α˜ ∈ K that differs from α∗ by two components:
α˜n−1 = α
∗
n = 0 and α˜n = α
∗
n−1 > 0, we have
G˜(α˜) > G˜(α∗)
which is a contradiction.
If α∗1 = α
∗
2 = · · · = α∗n = 0 and α∗n+1 6= 0, . . . , α∗N 6= 0 we obtain that(
α∗n+1, α
∗
n+2, . . . , α
∗
N
) ∈ Int(Kn).
We may conclude now that α∗ is in one of two situations and so α∗ is one of
the steady states for G˜(α). Corresponding to the two cases, α∗ is the solution
of one of the two systems
I.
∂G˜(α)
∂αj
= 0, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N};
II.


α1 = · · · = αn = 0, αn+1 6= 0, . . . , αN 6= 0,
∂G˜(α)
∂αj
= 0, j ∈ {n+ 1, . . . , N}.
Proof of Lemma 5. By calculus, we get from (13) for the particular case
n = 1 and y0 = 1 that
∂G˜(α)
∂α1
= ((1 − α1) + α1(−1)) et1(r−ρ)
+ α2 ((−1)(1− α1) + (1 − (α1 + α2))(−1)) et2(r−ρ)
+ α3 ((−1)(1− α1)(1− α2) + (1 − (α1 + α2 + α3))(−1)(1− α2)) et3(r−ρ).
+ αN
(
(−1)
N−1∏
i=1
(1− αi) + (1−
N∑
i=1
αi)(−1)
N−1∏
i=2
(1− αi)
)
etN (r−ρ)
= (1− α1)et1(r−ρ) +
∑
k≥1
αk(−1)etk(r−ρ)
k−1∏
i=1
(1 − αi)
+
∑
k≥2
αk
(
1−
k∑
i=1
αi
)
etk(r−ρ)(−1)
k−1∏
i=2
(1− αi).
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For the general case, when n = 1, 2, . . . , N , we observe that
∂G˜(α)
∂αn
= (1 −
n∑
i=1
αi)e
tn(r−ρ)
n−1∏
i=1
(1− αi)
+
∑
k≥n
αk(−1)etk(r−ρ)
k−1∏
i=1
(1− αi)
+
∑
k≥n+1
αk
(
1−
k∑
i=1
αi
)
etk(r−ρ)(−1)
k−1∏
i=2
i6=n
(1 − αi).
For n = N we have the necessary optimality condition for the last round as:
∂G˜(α)
∂αN
= y0(1−
N−1∑
i=1
αi − 2αN)etN (r−ρ)
N−1∏
i=1
(1− αi) = 0
Thus for slow growth we have
αi ≈ αN ≈ 1
N + 1
Proof of Lemma 6. The game now has the payoffs as in (14). Taking the
derivative w.r.t to the last round, assuming the other firms are symmetric we
find a necessary condition for optimal shares to satisfy:
∂ui(α−i)
∂αN
= y0αN (−1)etN (r−ρ)
N−1∏
i=1
(1− αi) +
y0(1 −
(
N−1∑
i=1
αi + αN + (I − 1)
n∑
y=1
αj,y
)
etN (r−ρ)
N−1∏
i=1
(1− αi) = 0
or
1−
(
N−1∑
i=1
αi + 2αN + (I − 1)
N−1∑
y=1
αj,y
)
= 0
or with symmetric shares
αi =
1− ((I − 1)∑N−1y=1 αj,y)
N + 1
or as then also αi ≈ αj,y for a low discounting rate and we have
α∗i ≈
1
I(N − 1) + 2
∀i = {1, ..., I}
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Examples for durable good analysis. 1. For N = 2 we then have
G˜(α) = y0
(
α1(1− α1)et1 + α2(1− (α1 + α2))et2(1− α1)
)
.
We set y0 = 1. α
∗ is the solution of one of the two system
I.


∂G˜(α)
∂α1
= 0,
∂G˜(α)
∂α2
= 0.
II.


α1 = 0, α2 6= 0,
∂G˜(α)
∂α2
= 0.
I. From
∂G˜(α)
∂α1
= et1 − 2α1et1 − 2α2et2 + α22et2 + 2α1α2et2 = 0
we get
α1 =
et1 − 2α2et2 + α22et2
2et1 − 2α2et2 .
Similarly, from
∂G˜(α)
∂α2
= et2 (α1 − 1) (α1 + 2α2 − 1) = 0
we get
α2 =
1
2
− 1
2
α1.
Solving simultaneously we find
α∗1 =
1
3et2
(
−4et1 + 3et2 + 2
√
et1 (4et1 − 3et2)
)
,
α∗2 =
1
3et2
(
2et1 −
√
et1 (4et1 − 3et2)
)
.
Note that for et1 → et2 we find
α∗1 →
1
3
,
α∗2 =
1
2
− 1
2
α∗1 →
1
3
.
Note also that if 34e
t2 < et1 < et2 then α∗1 < α
∗
2.
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II. From α1 = 0, α2 6= 0 and ∂G˜(α)
∂α2
= 0 we get
α∗1 = 0,
α∗2 =
1
2
.
Note that constraining the growth rate as above is sufficient to render G˜(α)
negative-semi definite. Alternatively one may add a convex cost term C(α). We
have left aside these condition in what follows to avoid notational clutter. By a
straightforward computation, one can easily check that the maximum of G˜(α)
is attained for α∗ ∈ Int(K).
2. For N = 3 we then have
G˜(α) = y0
(
α1(1− α1)et1 + α2(1− (α1 + α2))et2(1− α1)
+α3(1− (α1 + α2 + α3))et3(1− α1)(1− α2)
)
.
I. From
∂G˜(α)
∂α1
= 0, we find
α1 =
et1 − 2α2et2 − 2α3et3 + α22et2 + α23et3 − α2α23et3 − α22α3et3 + 3α2α3et3
2et1 − 2α2et2 − 2α3et3 + 2α2α3et3 .
(18)
From
∂G˜(α)
∂α2
= 0 we find
α1 =
1
et2 − α3et3
(
et2 − 2α2et2 − 2α3et3 + α23et3 + 2α2α3et3
)
. (19)
From
∂G˜(α)
∂α3
= 0 we find
α1 = 1− α2 − 2α3. (20)
Combining (18) and (19) yields:
α2 =
1
6et2 − 6α3et3 ×
 4t1 −
√
16e2t1 + α23e
2t3 + 2α33e
2t3 + α43e
2t3
−12t1et2 − 16α23et1et3 + 12α23et2et3 − 4α3et1et3
−5α3et3 + α23et3


Combining (19) and (20) yields:
α2 =
1
2et2 − 2α3et3 ×
 2t1 −
√
4e2t1 + 16e2t3e2t2 + α23e
2t3 + 6α33e
2t3+
9α43e
2t3 − 4et1et2 − 4α23et1et3 − 4α23et2et3 − 24α33et2et3
−4α3et2 − α3et3 + 3α23et3


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equating the two we get the optimal α3.
Note that for et1 → et2 → et3 we have
α2 =
1
6
−5α3 + α23 −
√
−4α3 − 3α23 + 2α33 + α43 + 4 + 4
1− α3
and
α2 =
1
2
−5α3 + 3α23 − 3
√
α23 − 2α33 + α43 + 2
1− α3 .
This system is solved by
α∗i = 1/4, i = 1, 2, 3.
II. a) From α1 = 0, α2 6= 0, α3 6= 0 and ∂G˜(α)
∂α2
= 0,
∂G˜(α)
∂α3
= 0 we get
α3 =
1
3t˜3
(
2t˜2 −
√
t˜2
(
4t˜2 − 3t˜3
))
,
α2 = 1− 2α3 = 1
3t˜3
(
3t˜3 − 4t˜2 + 2
√
t˜2
(
4t˜2 − 3t˜3
))
.
Note that for et2 → et3
α∗1 = 0,
α∗2 →
1
3
,
α∗3 →
1
3
.
II. b) From α1 = 0, α2 = 0, α3 6= 0 and ∂G˜(α)
∂α3
= 0 we get
α∗1 = α
∗
2 = 0,
α∗3 =
1
2
.
One can easily check that the maximum of G˜(α) is attained for α∗ ∈ Int(K).
Proof of Lemma 7. Because payoffs are discounted there will be an interior
discount rate ρ > 0 small enough, such that
max
αi∈A
∫ t1
0

e−ρtα
i
(t)

1− αi(t)−∑
j 6=i
α∗,rj (t)

 fα(t−)− C(α(t))

 dt+
∫ T
t1

e−ρtαi(t)

1− αi(t)−∑
j 6=i
α∗j (t)

 fα(t−)− C(α(t))

 dt <
∫ T
0

e−ρtα∗,ri (t)

1− α∗,ri (t)−∑
j 6=i
α∗,rj (t)

 fα(t−)− C(α(t))

 dt
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∀i = {1, ..., I} and deviation does not pay off with grim punishments. Clearly
also punishment that “fit the crime” as in Green and Porter (1984) may be
employed.
Proof of Proposition 8. For the cartel behaviour the aggregate statistic can
be rewritten for each round N > 1 as
p˜M,r = 1−
(
1
I
I∑
i=1
αM,ri +
1
I
I∑
i=1
ε˜i
)
An individual deviation (w.l.o.g. by firm i) changes the aggregate statistic to
p˜d,r = 1−
(
1
I
(αdi +
1
I
I∑
−i
αM,r−i ) +
1
I
I∑
i=1
ε˜i
)
and so the visibility of individual (deviation) actions is decreasing in ◦(1/I).
Rewrite errors as
1
I
I∑
i=1
ε˜i =
√
V ar(ε)√
I
√
I
(
1
I
∑I
i=1 ε˜i
)
√
V ar(ε)
and note that by the Central Limit Theorem
√
I
(
1
I
∑I
i=1 ε˜i
)
√
V ar(ε)
→ N(0, 1)
so that the noise term decreases in ◦(1/√I) which prevents individual detection
in the limit. If it is individually optimal to go only one round i.e. N = 1 (e.g.
if C(α(t)) is not sufficiently convex), then the limit principle holds irrespective
of the degree of noise.
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